Attackers can exploit software vulnerabilities through patches by either manually or automatically identifying vulnerable code. However, for certain types of patches, the effectiveness of exploit tools can be diminished, thus closing an attacker's window of opportunity. E very second Tuesday of the month, Microsoft releases its "Patch Tuesday" software updates. These updates include security patches, most of which are documented to inform system administrators about what's vulnerable. Microsoft typically words this without giving concrete hints on how to exploit the fixed vulnerabilities, but its descriptions don't always match the patched vulnerabilities, and some aren't even mentioned. 1 So when security researchers or attackers get their hands on binary patches, they start inspecting them in preparation for "Exploit Wednesday," the window of opportunity for attackers to target unsuspicious users who didn't immediately apply the update. In some cases, attackers can also target users who did apply the patch immediately but were left vulnerable because a fix wasn't complete. 2 With the help of so-called diffing tools such as Darungrim (www.darungrim.org) and BinDiff (www.zynamics.com/bindiff.html), attackers compare the binary code before and after the patch to identify the fixed code fragments and the applied fixes, determine the closed vulnerabilities, and ultimately devise actual exploits for those vulnerabilities.
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While Patch Tuesday and Exploit Wednesday are the best-known instances of this scenario, it takes place every time software vendors release binary security updates. Attackers can, for example, launch a similar exploit to identify the code that implements new functionality in software updates as a first step toward reverse-engineering or stealing intellectual property.
They can also use such attacks and diffing tools to port information from one program version to another. Once they identify the corresponding parts in consecutive program versions, attackers can more easily reuse their existing reverse-engineering knowledge.
David Brumley and his colleagues demonstrated that exploits can sometimes be devised without any human code analysis or understanding: all the attack needs is an accurate identification of the new instructions that the patch inserted. 3 On that basis, attackers apply constraint-solving techniques on program inputs to generate attacks automatically. To the best of our knowledge, any published patched-based attack to date similarly builds on the assumption that expert attackers assisted by diffing tools can easily identify the relatively few relevant differences between unpatched and patched binaries. [4] [5] [6] In this article, we demonstrate that this assumption is often but not always valid for ordinary code-in fact, it falls apart completely for diversified code. Here, diversification is the deliberate generation of different binaries from the same source code. We evaluate how it complicates and delays the identification of vulnerable code by making the diffing tools less effective. A delay shortens the attacker's window of opportunity, thus reducing the potential profit. It also corresponds to an increased effort to compensate for the tools' reduced effectiveness, and hence to an increased investment on the attacker's part.
Software Protection

Modeling Attack Effort and Delay
To evaluate the attack effort and the incurred delay, we model it in terms of quantitative program properties that relate to real attacks.
When patches change a program's semantics at specific source code locations, the compiled binary will incur semantic mutations at corresponding locations. In addition, many (small) syntactic mutations will spread through the binary as a result of changed code offsets and global compiler optimizations. Security researchers and attackers use diffing tools to differentiate the syntactic mutations from the semantic ones. The tools compare abstract representations of the original and patched binaries and return a score for each code fragment, indicating where they found completely or partially equivalent counterparts in the other binary. This matching score can be graphical, as in Figure 1 , or numerical. Using his or her experience, the matching scores, and additional heuristics, the attacker then implicitly or explicitly ranks all fragments and inspects them manually or automatically to identify the semantic mutations that reveal vulnerabilities. Attackers can use the same approach to identify, reverse-engineer, and lift new functionality from software updates.
To model the additional effort attackers incur through diversification, we developed scripts that automate the application of commonly used diffing tools and heuristics. When we apply the scripts on a patch of which we know the ground truth, we can compute the ranking of all relevant instructions. This ranking corresponds to the number of instructions that the attacker will have to inspect and analyze manually or that his or her tools will have to target automatically. We can therefore model the additional effort an attacker incurs via diversification from the difference in the relevant instructions' ranking with and without diversification.
How that additional effort delays an attacker depends on his or her approach. When an attack continues with the manual inspection of the supposedly most interesting code fragments, the additional effort incurred by diversification can only be parallelized at very high cost. Therefore, a delay proportional to the decreased effectiveness of the diffing tools is to be expected.
For a specific type of security patch-namely, inserted input-validity checks-the automated patchbased exploitation generation (APEG) approach by Brumley and colleagues can be parallelized almost completely by running the technique in parallel for every potential new check identified by the diffing tools. 3 This seems to imply that for this type of security patch, software diversification wouldn't significantly delay attackers with large amounts of computing resources in the cloud or in botnets. However, APEG initially treats all conditional branches found in the patched program but not in the original program as potential new checks. For each of these branches, it will try to construct program inputs that trigger the check in the patched program and that cause a security property to be violated in the original program. For conditional branches that don't correspond to input-validity checks but that merely reflect syntactic changes that thwarted the diffing tools, the iterative search for ever-more complex inputs that violate security properties will explode combinatorially, making the APEG approach much less efficient, if useful at all. 3 So, even when exploits can in theory be generated automatically, attackers can expect a significant delay related to the drop in those tools' effectiveness.
Case Studies
Buffer overflows and integer overflows are among the most common program vulnerabilities. Causes include insufficient input-validity checking, coding errors such as neglecting the null character that terminates strings, and unsafe buffer manipulation APIs. The three security cases we evaluate are all patches for these common vulnerabilities. We also added a functionality patch that replaces one algorithm with another. This case represents scenarios of patch-based IP theft. The first security patch we evaluate, hereafter called bzip2, fixed the integer-overflow vulnerability CVE2010-0405 in the bzip2 program by inserting a check, as indicated in Figure 2a . This patch is similar to input-validity checks to protect against buffer overflows. In the binary, it inserts a short instruction sequence as shown in Figure 3a .
Our second security patch is an off-by-one fix for vulnerability CVE-2008-3964 in the pngtest utility; specifically, the fix decrements a hard-coded, incorrect buffer length as shown in Figure 2b . We will refer to this patch, available through the Debian GNU/Linux distribution as a separate patch, as png_ debian. In the binary, it resulted in four mutations to immediate operands: in two similar fragments, the constant 30 is replaced by 29, and the absolute address of tIME_string [30] is replaced by that of tIME_string [29] . Figure 3b shows one of those changed fragments.
In other distributions, this fix was part of a larger update from libpng 1.2.23-beta01 to beta02 that also contains a lot of patches not related to CVE-2008-3964. In that larger update, the relevant code fragments were patched as shown in Figure 2c . In addition to the changed length, the call to png_strncpy is replaced by a call to png_memcpy. The compiler inlines that call and unrolls its data-copying loop, so in the patched binary, the call to png_strncpy, including the preparation of arguments, is replaced by a sequence of mov instructions as shown in Figure 3c . We refer to this security patch as png_beta.
Finally, we chose a SPEC (www.spec.org) benchmark program and a patch that replaces two (out of several more) calls to quicksort with calls to a newly added mergesort. We call this functionality patch soplex. With this SPEC benchmark program comes training and reference inputs that enable us to conduct valid performance experiments.
We compiled and statically linked the original and patched source code on Linux with gcc -03. As a result of the static linking, the binary modules fed to the diffing tools are quite large. This is in line with the trend we observe on Microsoft Windows systems where applications are more and more distributed as a few large dynamically linked libraries (DLLs) instead of many small ones to reduce the number of inter-DLL interfaces that expose sensitive symbolic information to attackers. As such, we believe our results can be extrapolated to, for example, Windows systems. Table 1 shows the patched binary sizes as well as the sizes of the binary patches generated with the bsdiff tool. The three relatively large patch sizes indicate that those patches involve many syntactic mutations, which the attacker has to weed out.
Diffing Tools and Heuristics
IDA Pro (www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/index. shtml) is by far the most used tool to disassemble and inspect binary code. 7 It disassembles the binary code into assembler instructions, which are then partitioned into basic blocks (single-entry single-exit sequences of instructions) and functions, on the basis of which IDA Pro constructs control-flow graphs (CFGs) and a call graph. Users can then invoke plugins to analyze or transform the constructed graphs. Code disassembly, CFG construction, and call graph construction are notoriously difficult tasks, especially when programs have been obfuscated. 8 IDA Pro therefore occasionally disassembles and partitions code incorrectly. Consequently, the plug-ins operate on incomplete, incorrect CFGs, which affects their overall effectiveness.
Several diffing plug-ins exist that try to identify the matching fragments in two program versions. They use TurboDiff first tries to match functions and then tries to find matching basic block pairs. The tool's output differentiates among completely identical, mutated, and unmatched basic blocks. As IDA Pro does not disassemble all code, TurboDiff also leaves some blocks unreported. Similarly, BinDiff first matches functions, then tries to match basic blocks, and finally tries to match instructions. BinDiff reports matched and unmatched instructions, but some instructions remain unreported.
The diffing tools thus partition the code fragments into categories that the attacker can rank with his or her heuristics-for example, code fragments categorized as not having changed at all are less likely to contain semantic mutations-but there's no absolute guarantee. When pairs of fragments are reported as identical, it only means that the similarity as computed by the tool at its particular abstraction level is above some threshold, not that the fragments are really identical.
For that reason, we always report both the recall and the pruning factor obtained with a tool and heuristics. Recall is the fraction of all relevant instructions retrieved. 9 For an attacker tool to be effective, it has to retrieve as much as possible of the instructions that encode semantic mutations, so higher recall is better. The pruning factor relates to the standard metric of precision, 9 which is the fraction of all retrieved instructions that are relevant. We don't report precision, however, because it depends as much on the patch's size as on the number of retrieved instructions. Precision is therefore not a good metric to model an attacker's effort or delay. Instead, we report the pruning factor, which is the fraction of all instructions not retrievedthe fraction of the whole program pruned away for further inspection. As its pruning factor increases, a tool becomes more effective.
Besides ranking the various tool-determined fragment categories, attackers use heuristics and perform additional actions with the tools. We investigated the following potentially useful heuristics and optimizations: ■ Code not triggered by inputs is less relevant. The rationale for this assumption is that both tools and humans face the problems of determining which execution paths through a program are feasible and which code is reachable. To avoid wasting time on infeasible execution paths or unreachable code, attackers will focus We observed that such basic blocks typically originate from autogenerated code such as stack unwinding code, in which case it won't include vulnerabilities anyway, or from IDA Pro's bad partitioning of code into functions. In the latter case, the rationale is that blocks reported as unreachable in their function probably haven't been matched because of the bad partitioning of code into functions rather than not having a matching counterpart in the other binary. ■ Expand the observed instruction window. In practice, attackers will browse CFGs displayed side by side, as in Figure 1 . Without any effort, they then also observe the instructions surrounding the instructions categorized by the tool as mutated. We can model this behavior by expanding the sequences of instructions that the tool has categorized as mutated. For this article, we expand those instruction sequences with surrounding instructions that are mutated according to the ground truth. This models experienced attackers that can instantly prune all irrelevant code displayed as not mutated. The expansion also lets us evaluate the extent to which the tools guide attackers toward the relevant instructions even when the tools do not retrieve them directly.
All of these heuristics extend or prune the set of instructions considered relevant. They are implemented by means of external tools, by invoking (interactive) options of the diffing tools, and by postprocessing the output of the diffing tools-the three options available to attackers that rely on diffing tools. Figure 4 presents the results obtained with 10 combinations of heuristics per tool. Grayed pruning factors mark experiments that didn't identify any relevant instructions.
Results
Which tools and heuristics perform best depends on the use case. For bzip2, BinDiff gives the best pruning (see a), but only with the expansion heuristic. TurboDiff prunes less, but contrary to BinDiff, it identifies all relevant instructions directly (see b). When only considering direct identification of relevant instructions, TurboDiff in general gives a higher recall than BinDiff (compare, for example, c to d). For png_beta, BinDiff scores best (see f). BinDiff also works best for soplex, albeit with different heuristics (see g).
For png_debian, BinDiff 's abstractions cannot identify any relevant instruction. TurboDiff identifies the changed immediate operands (see c and e), but only when using the appropriate heuristics. When those Software Protection heuristics are applied for any other patch, they don't at all achieve the highest pruning. For the minimal patch of png_debian, an attacker is better off with the binary code patch itself, which encodes precisely the semantic mutations to four immediate operands. The patch thus points attackers directly to nothing more than the relevant instructions. This "shortcut" is only available, however, because all syntactic changes in this use case are semantic changes. When such a minimal security fix involving only changed constants is combined with other (nonrelated) fixes as in png_debian, the patch includes many more syntactic mutations, which prevents it from being used as a shortcut.
Considering only the combinations of tools and heuristics with recalls over 70 percent, the highest pruning factors obtained with BinDiff are 99.988 percent (i), 99.986 percent (a), and 99.909 percent (j). As the fractions of irrelevant instructions in those cases are 99.997 percent, 99.986 percent, and 99.923 percent, respectively, BinDiff proves to be able to prune more than 99.98 percent of all irrelevant instructions for those three use cases.
This demonstrates, for the first time, that for some types of patches and undiversified code, diffing tools and heuristics are indeed highly valuable attacker tools. For other types of patches, however, they're much less effective. Moreover, as an attacker typically doesn't know beforehand which types of patches have been applied, he or she will be hindered by not being able to fine-tune the heuristics.
Diversification
To study diversification's impact, we used the diversifier Proteus 10 that comes with the free and open Diablo link-time rewriting framework (http://diablo.elis. ugent.be). This tool supports several standard code generation, optimization, and obfuscation techniques, but rather than optimizing a performance or software protection objective, it applies the transformations in a stochastic manner using a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). Proteus can generate different versions of a binary simply by feeding the PRNG with different seeds. To trade off the level of diversification with the overhead introduced by this stochastic application of transformations, the user can select the probabilities with which the transformations are applied. When generating two program versions with all transformation probabilities set to 0.5, Proteus generates the most diverse binaries.
Some important aspects of the diversification are that the mapping between program fragments in two diversified binaries is an n-to-m mapping, that CFG shapes become heavily mutated, that direct controlflow transfers are hidden behind indirect ones, and that a program's code layout can't be relied on to reconstruct functions. These properties directly target the matching heuristics in the diffing tools that rely on function CFG similarity and on the rather common assumption of one-to-one mappings.
It's important to note that the diversifying transformations we used are very similar to standard code transformations in compilers. For example, the applied transformations are already available or can easily be implemented in LLVM (http://llvm.org), a compiler To study the trade-off between security-wise effectiveness and performance-wise efficiency, we present diffing results for binaries diversified at two levels of diversification. Experiments with other settings confirm the trends presented here. For the four use cases and two diversification levels, we generated 10 pairs of an unpatched and a patched binary, using 80 different PRNG seeds. We then applied 40 combinations of tools and heuristics on the 8 × 10 pairs of patched and unpatched program versions, for a total of 3,200 diffing attempts. Figure 5 plots the results of the 1,600 attempts with BinDiff and TurboDiff next to the Pareto-optimal results from Figure 4 . With the right heuristics, which differ from patch to patch, the tools can still retrieve all relevant instructions from the diversified binaries. However, they can only do so at pruning factors of around 90 percent. The amount of code still needing manual analysis has thus grown 100-fold. We can also see that higher levels of diversification don't offer a lot of additional protection. Table 1 shows that our diversification comes with considerable overhead. While the binaries only grow 20 percent with low diversity, the patches that would be distributed typically become between one and two orders of magnitude larger. For the small png_ debian, the patch becomes even 1,690 times bigger. Furthermore, our stochastic diversification results in considerable slowdowns, ranging from 20 to 39 percent for low diversification. For higher diversification, the overhead becomes even higher.
Resilience
Our experimental results hint that when applied to diversified software, diffing tools become less effective. Attackers can try to work around this problem by not diffing the original and patched binaries but by diffing normalized versions instead, which replaces complex code constructs and variations with simpler, standardized versions. For example, after collecting traces of a program, tools such as Ariadne (http:// ariadne.group-ib.ru) can replace obfuscated, indirect control flow by unobfuscated, direct counterparts. This will help IDA Pro determine the functions and minimize the number of syntactic differences. Diablo has already been used to perform trace-based deobfuscation, 11 and tools like DynInst (www.dyninst.org) can collect traces even in the presence of advanced anti debugging techniques. Seemingly nothing stops attackers from undoing most if not all of the diversification before diffing the programs.
However, attackers do face a couple of major hurdles. First, when diversification is implemented in a modular compiler such as LLVM, it can build on the randomized enabling and disabling of all available code transformations. As many transformations depend on each other (sometimes involving phase-ordering issues) and on the availability of high-level semantic information (such Software Protection as type information), which isn't available in binary code, fully deoptimizing a binary program to normalize it is impossible, as is fully optimizing it. So it's doubtful that complete or even close-to-complete normalization is possible.
Second, the normalization can be expected to be sensitive to the precise form of diversification used. For example, an attacker might try to remove opaque predicates from both program versions by eliminating conditional branches that are only executed in one direction on his or her set of inputs. But because the attacker doesn't yet have an exploit input to trigger new inputvalidity checks, the corresponding branches will also be eliminated. By parameterizing the diversification, the software vendor might be able to force the attacker to retune tools and heuristics for every released patch or to make them interactive. In both cases, this would increase the attacker's effort and shorten the window of opportunity.
O ur experiments have shown that software diversification can significantly reduce the effectiveness of diffing tools taken for granted by patch-based exploit developers. Diversification thus offers the potential to shorten the window of opportunity and potential gains.
Our form of stochastic diversification comes with high overhead, however, so for now, we consider diversification an effective but not necessarily efficient protection against patch-based attacks. Whether it's worth the overhead will depend on a patch's criticality. When a white-hat security researcher contacts a developer about an exploitable 0-day vulnerability, it can be critical to fix that vulnerability without exposing it publicly via an obvious patch. When some bug has been known publicly for a long time but no exploit has ever been constructed, there's less need to protect a patch.
In the continuing software protection arms race, it's the defender's job to keep up with attackers. Whenever one of them progresses, an evaluation like the one presented here will have to be repeated to reevaluate both players' positions. In the near future, we plan to work on the trade-off between overhead and protection by using a more controlled, autotuning approach driven by feedback from the diffing scripts, as well as on the incorporation of normalization tools on the attacker's side.
